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SECTION 1 OF THE CHAR TER*
BY MARTHA JACKMAN*
The author argues that, under section 1 of the Charter,
the courts must weigh carefully the democratic
potential of rights guarantees against the democratic
quality of govemment.decisionswhich undermine those
rights. The article points to the Egan andEldridge cases
as examples of decisions in which the willingness to
uphold rights violations under section 1, in the name of
deference to the legislature, actually undermines
democratic values. The article examines the AiR-
MacDonald decision as a starting point for a section 1
analysis which identifies the characteristics of
government decisionmaking that must be present if
rights violations are to be justified under section 1,
understood in terms of the Charter's combined
objectives of protecting rights and of promoting
democracy.
L'auteure soutient qu'en vertu de l'article premier de la
Charte, les tribunaux doivent soupeser avec pr6caution
les possibilit~s offertes sur le plan d6mocratique par la
garantie des droits ainsi que la qualit6 d6mocratique
des ddcisions gouvernmentales portant atteinte A ces
droits. Cet article pr~sente les arrets Egan et E!dridge
comme des exemples de decisions parmi lesquelles la
volont6 de justifier les violations des droits en vertu de
l'article premier, par d~f~rence envers la 16gislature, a
min6 les valeurs d~mocratiques. Cet article examine
l'arr~t PJR-MacDonald en tant que point de depart
d'une analyse de l'article premier, en identifiant les
caract6ristiques du processus d~cisionnel
gouvernemental necessaires pour justifier la violation
des droits reconnus par la Charte, le tout dans le
respect de ses objectifs de protection des droits et de
promotion de la d~mocratie.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In his landmark decision in R. v. Oakes,' former Chief Justice
Dickson prefaced his review of the specific elements of a section 1
analysis under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms2 with an
important reminder of the fundamental purpose for which the Charter
was entrenched in the Canadian Constitution: "Inclusion of [the] words
'free and democratic society' ... as the final standard of justification for
limits on rights and freedoms refers the Court to the very purpose for
which the Charter was originally entrenched in the Constitution:
Canadian society is to be free and democratic."3
Dickson C.J.'s reference to the dual purpose for which the
Charter was enacted: to protect individual rights and to promote
democracy, regretfully, has been largely ignored in subsequent
commentary and case law. Critics of the Charter depict judicial review
on Charter grounds as profoundly anti-democratic: pitting individual
rights against Parliamentary democracy.4 In interpreting and enforcing
individual rights, Canadian judges have also often failed to recognize or.
to give life to the Charter's potential for improving the democratic tenor
of decisionmaking at all levels of government 5
The failure to see substantive rights review as a mechanism for
1 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 [hereinafter Oakes].
2 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.
11 [hereinafter Charter]. Section 1 provides: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."
3 Oakes, supra note 1 at 136.
4 See, for example, A.A. Peacock, ed., Rethinking the Constitution: Perspectives on Canadian
Constitutional Reform, Interpretation and Theory (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1996); R.
Knopff & F.L. Morton, Charter Politics (Scarborough, Ont.: Nelson Canada, 1992); M. Mandel, The
Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada (Toronto: Thompson Educational, 1994)
c. 2; A.C. Hutchinson & A. Petter, "Private Rights/Public Wrongs: The Liberal Lie of the Charter"
(1988) 38 U.T.L.J. 278; and R.I. Cheffins & P.A. Johnson, The Revised Canadian Constitution:
Politics as Law (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1986).
5 Consider, for example, the Supreme Court of Canada's narrow interpretation of the
obligations imposed on government by the freedom of expression guarantee under section 2(b) of
the Charter in Native Women's Association of Canada v. Canada, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 627.
[VOL. 34 No. 4
Protecting Rights and Promoting Democracy
enhancing democracy is equally true of the courts' approach to section 1
of the Charter. Notwithstanding Dickson C.J.'s point of departure in
Oakes, judicial analyses under section 1 have proceeded on the basis that
individual rights and democracy are inherently at odds. In applying
section 1, the courts have rarely focused on the extent to which
justification of a particular rights violation would either promote or
undermine fundamental democratic principles and values. Where
democratic considerations have been factored into the section 1 analysis,
this has often been done in an unprincipled and ad hoc way.
In the discussion that follows, I will argue that, if the Charter is to
fulfil its initial promise-not only to protect individual rights, but to
promote a more truly democratic society-the courts must be more
attuned to the Charter's democracy-related objectives. In other words,
government decisions which violate individual rights should not
automatically be assumed to be legitimate and defensible in democratic
terms. At the same time, individual rights should not be perceived
simply as barriers surrounding individuals, protecting them from
government and from community, but rather as affirmative mechanisms
for ensuring that individuals can participate fully in Canadian society
and its democratic institutions.6 With regard to section I in particular, I
will argue that the courts must carefully weigh the democratic potential
of individual rights guarantees against the democratic quality of the
government decisions which undermine those rights, before coming to a
decision whether the requisite section 1 standard of justification has
been met.
In order to support this claim, the discussion will proceed in
three parts. First, I will examine Sopinka J.'s opinion in Egan v. Canada7
and Lambert J.A.'s opinion in Eldridge v. British Columbia (A.G.)8 as
examples of decisions in which the willingness to uphold individual rights
violations under section 1 of the Charter, under guise of deference to the
legislature, actually undermines democratic values. Second, I will
consider La Forest J.'s and McLachlin J.'s judgments in IJR -MacDonald
Inc. v. Canada (A.G.)9 as a starting point for a section 1 analysis which
takes proper account of democratic considerations in assessing
6 The issue of how judicial review of substantive rights guarantees can reinforce democracy is
discussed in greater depth in M. Jackman, "Rights and Participation: The Use of the Charter to
Supervise the Regulatory Process" (1990) 4 Can. J. Admin. L & P. 23.
7 [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 [hereinafter Egan].
8 (1995), 7 B.C.L.R. (3d) 156 (C.A.) [hereinafter Eldridge]. An appeal from the decision was
heard by the Supreme Court of Canada on 24 April 1997.
9 [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 [hereinafter R -MacDonald].
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infringements of individual rights. I conclude by summarizing the
characteristics of government decisionmaking which, in my view, must be
present if rights violations are to be justified under section 1. Such
characteristics are understood in terms of the Charter's combined
objectives of protecting individual rights and of promoting a more
vibrant Canadian democracy.
II. CONFOUNDING DEFERENCE AND DEMOCRACY:
THE EGAN AND ELDRIDGE DECISIONS
The Egan case involved a section 15 challenge, before the
Supreme Court of Canada, to the exclusion of same-sex partners from
eligibility for spousal benefits under the federal Old Age Security Act.1O
The Eldridgell case involved a section 15 challenge, before the British
Columbia Court of Appeal, to the provincial government's failure to
provide funding for medical interpretation services for the Deaf within
the publicly funded health care system. Sopinka J.'s section 1 analysis in
Egan and Lambert J.A.'s section I analysis in Eldridge will be discussed
in turn.
A. Sopinka J.'s Analysis in the Egan Case
In Egan, Sopinka J. agreed with the dissenting justices that the
appellants' right to equality without discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation was violated by the disparate treatment of heterosexual and
same sex spouses under section 2 of the OASA. Sopinka J. joined with the
majority, however, on the question of whether this infringement could be
justified under section 1 of the Charter.12
Sopinka J. began his section 1 review of the OASA by stating that
"[iut is not realistic for the Court to assume that there are unlimited
funds to address the needs of all,"13 and by warning that a proactive
judicial approach to Charter review of social benefit schemes will make
governments reluctant to create new programs for fear of expanded
10 R.S.C. 1985, c. 0-9 [hereinafter OASA].
11 Supra note 8.
12 Egan, supra note 7 at 572.
13Ibid.
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future liability.14 Sopinka J. then invoked La Forest J.'s reasoning in
McKinney v. University of Guelph15 as a basis for finding that the federal
government's decision to exclude same-sex spouses from the old age
security regime was justifiable. In terms of the proper section 1
approach to be adopted in the Egan case, Sopinka J. stated that, similar
to the situation in McKinney:
the legislation in question represents the kind of socio-economic question in respect of
which the government is required to mediate between competing groups rather than
being the protagonist of an individual. In these circumstances the Court will be more
reluctant to second-guess the choice which Parliament has made.16
Sopinka J. concluded his very cursory section 1 analysis of the
OASA by commenting on the government's delay in remedying
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation under federal
legislation. He suggested that, in view of the novelty of the concept of
same-sex spousal relationships, the government's inaction did not
disentitle it from relying on section 1 of the Charter.17
Throughout his section 1 analysis, Sopinka J. showed extreme
deference to the government and its legislative choices. He
characterized the exclusion of same-sex spouses from the OASA as the
result of a measured, incremental, legislative approach to the problem of
alleviating poverty among elderly spouses, and as a careful balancing of
competing social interests and the demands of competing groups. In
coming to this conclusion, however, Sopinka J. misapplied La Forest J.'s
analysis in the McKinney decision and mischaracterized both the
governmental decision-making process and the interests at stake in the
Egan case.
La Forest J.'s analysis of section 1 in the McKinney case related
primarily to section 9(a) of the Ontario Human Rights Code,18 which, by
limiting protection against age-related discrimination in employment to
those under age sixty-five, was held to infringe section 15 of the Charter.
The crucial question posed by La Forest J. at the section 1 stage in
McKinney was whether, given the complexity of the mandatory
retirement issue and the competing social and economic interests
involved, "the government had a reasonable basis for concluding that the
14 Ibidc at 572-73.
15 [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229 [hereinafter McKinney].
16 Egan, supra note 7 at 575-76.
171bid at 576.
18 S.O. 1981, c. 53 (now R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, s. 10(1)(a)).
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legislation impaired the relevant right as little as possible given the
government's pressing and substantial objectives." 19
There was considerable evidence in McKinney that the provincial
legislature had devoted significant attention to the issue of whether the
Ontario Human Rights Code should continue to deny protection against
mandatory retirement at age sixty-five. La Forest J. quoted extensively
from the relevant legislative debates, including statements by the
Minister of Labour during second reading of the Bill and at the
committee stage. The Minister's comments in the legislature and before
the committee made it clear that the government had carefully weighed
the interests of those seeking an increase in the age of mandatory
retirement against the interests of employees who might be adversely
affected by a delay in the retirement age or benefits, the interests of
younger persons attempting to enter the workforce, and related labour
market adjustment issues.20 La Forest J. summarized the Ontario
legislature's deliberations as follows: "What comes out clearly from the
debates is the anguish of the members in the face of a measure, which
for reasons they viewed as overriding, they felt could not be extended to
the protection of the elderly .... "21
In McKinney, deference to the government's legislative choice at
the minimal impairment stage of the Oakes analysis was warranted on
several grounds. First, the legislature itself made the impugned decision.
Second, it did so after considering carefully the competing social and
economic issues and interests involved. And, third, the decision to limit
the rights of one group was in fact taken in order to promote the rights
of others: older workers who would be adversely affected by a change in
the mandatory retirement age and younger workers facing serious
obstacles to labour market entry.
In contrast to the McKinney case, deference to the legislature,
either on grounds of institutional competence or democratic legitimacy,
is not warranted in the Egan case. In justifying the OASA 2 2 under section
1, Sopinka J. did not refer to any convincing evidence presented by the
federal government as part of its section 1 defence that the decision to
provide same-sex benefits under the OASA raised unduly complex
socio-economic issues which the legislative branch is better able to
address. Nor was any evidence provided by the federal government, or
19 McKinney, supra note 15 at 309 [emphasis in original].
20 1bi. at 300-01.
2 1 Ibid. at 301.
2 2 Supra note 10.
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relied upon by Sopinka J., that Parliament had turned its attention
directly to this issue, or that it had been forced to exclude same-sex
spouses from the legislation in order to meet the equally compelling
rights of a competing group.
In other words, while Sopinka J.'s judgment was couched in
terms of deference to the legislature, the Egan decision does not in fact
reflect or reinforce democratic principles or values. The fundamental
reason that federal legislation continues to discriminate against gays and
lesbians-that is, their social and political marginalization-was not
acknowledged by Sopinka J. as a relevant factor under section 1. Nor
did he take account of the extent to which recognition of the equal rights
of same-sex couples would improve the ability of gays and lesbians to
participate as equal members in Canadian social and political life. By
characterizing the need to address discrimination against same-sex
relationships in social benefits legislation as a novel problem, Sopinka J.
sanctioned Parliament's continuing unwillingness to recognize gays and
lesbians as citizens of equal merit and worth. And by ignoring the
predictable impact, in terms of Parliament's legislative agenda, of the
under-representation of gays and lesbians and their concerns within the
legislative process, he tacitly reinforced this malfunctioning within our
democratic system.
B. Lambert JlA.'s Analysis in the Eldridge Case
In his judgment in the Eldridge case,23 Lambert J.A. dissented
from the majority opinion of the Court of Appeal and found that British
Columbia's failure to provide medical interpretation services for the
Deaf within the publicly funded health care system violated section 15 of
the Charter. However, he went on to find that this violation of the
equality rights of the Deaf can be justified under section 1 of the Charter.
Like Sopinka J. in Egan, Lambert J.A. prefaced his discussion of section
1 by referring to the current fiscal climate:
There is a national debate underway at the moment about the reduction of funds to be
transferred from Canada to the provinces ... . There is a debate underway in each
province about the expenditure priorities for the reduced funds. In the allocation of
scarce financial resources, each province will be required to make choices about spending
priorities.24
2 3 Supra note 8 at 178.
24 bid at 180.
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In this context, he determined, the courts cannot become involved in
decisions about the allocation of health care resources. Even where
constitutional rights are at issue, he maintained, courts have neither the
knowledge nor the mandate to interfere:
How can we say, in those circumstances, that expenditure of scarce resources on services
that remedy infringed constitutional rights under s. 15 ... are more desirable than
expenditures of scarce resources on things that cure people without affecting
constitutional rights ... . And, indeed, how can we prefer the allocation of scarce
resources to services that remedy the infringed constitutional rights of one disadvantaged
group over ... services that remedy the infringed constitutional rights of a different
disadvantaged group.25
In view of the multiplicity of choices facing the legislature,
Lambert J.A. held that any discrimination resulting from health care
resource allocation decisions "should be rectified, if at all, by legislative
or administrative action and not by judicial action."26 This is a case,
Lambert J.A. concluded, for "judicial restraint and for deference under
the Constitution and under s. 1 of the Charter to legislative policy and
administrative expertise."27
In coming to this decision, Lambert J.A. failed to subject the
government's section 15 violation to careful scrutiny, in keeping with the
analytical framework established by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Oakes and subsequent decisions. In terms even more explicit than
Sopinka J. in Egan, Lambert J.A. bypassed a conventional section 1
analysis, and instead concluded that the court should defer to the
government's choice to violate the equality rights of the Deaf because of
the legislature's greater institutional competence and democratic
legitimacy. As in Egan, however, the decision-making process which
resulted in the violation of the equality rights of the Deaf in Eldridge did
not warrant the judicial deference which Lambert J.A. accorded to it.
At the outset of his section 1 analysis, Lambert J.A. referred to
the policy debate taking place at the national and provincial levels in
terms of the allocation of shrinking health care resources. He suggested
that, within each province, complex factors will have to be weighed and
difficult choices made.28 As in Egan, however, there was no evidence
that the decision to infringe the equality rights of the Deaf in Eldridge
was in fact the product of a careful or informed legislative choice. The
251Jbid.
2 6 Ibid.
2 7 1bid. at 181.
28 1bid. at 180.
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decision to deny funding for medical interpretation services for the Deaf
was not made by the legislature, following deliberations of the type
which occurred in the McKinney case. Rather, the decision was made at
an informal policy level, by a legislative sub-delegate within the
provincial health ministry.29 As many commentators have pointed out,
this type of delegated decisionmaking, while a pervasive feature of
current Canadian government, is not subject to any significant degree of
legislative oversight or control 3 0
Nor, in contrast to the situation in McKinney, was the decision in
Eldridge the result of a careful weighing of available evidence, or of a
careful balancing of competing interests. Evidence accepted at trial
showed that the annual cost to the provincial government of providing
medical interpretation services for the Deaf was in the order of
$150,000, as against an annual provincial health care budget of $6
billion.31 Aside from the modest amount at stake, the government made
no effort to rebut the claim that funding interpretation services for the
Deaf might actually reduce, rather than increase, provincial health care
spending by leading to more effective and efficient delivery of health
care services to the Deaf.
Furthermore, contrary to McKinney, there was no evidence in
Eldridge that the government's refusal to provide the requisite funding
was dictated by a need to protect the competing interests or rights of
another group. Rather, the decision to deny funding for interpretation
services for the Deaf was made by health ministry officials in an attempt
to forestall potential future demands for interpretation services by
non-English speaking groups.3 2 As in Egan, the motivation for the
choice was, at best, systemically discriminatory. And, as in Egan, the
only competing interest was a general desire to limit government
spending.
A refusal by the court to justify the violation of the equality
rights of the Deaf under section 1 would, quite apart from its merits in
29 Ibid. at 163-64.
30 See, for example, Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Finance,
Regulations and Competitiveness: Seventeenth Report of the Standing Committee on Finance/First
Report of the Sub-Committee on Regulations and Competitiveness (Chair: M. Dorin) (Ottawa:
Queen's Printer, 1993) at 55-56; J.R. Mallory, "Can Parliament Control the Regulatory Process?"
(1983) 6 (3) Can. Parl. Rev. 6; T. D'Aquino, G.B. Doern & C. Blair, Parliamentary Democracy in
Canada: Issues for Reform (Toronto: Methuen, 1983); and J.R. Mallory, "Curtailing 'Divine Right':
The Control of Delegated Legislation in Canada" in O.P. Dwivedi, ed., The Administrative State in
Canada: Essays in Honour ofJ.E. Hodgetts (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982) 131.
31 Eldridge, supra note 8 at 163-64.
32 Ibid. at 164.
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individual rights terms, clearly have been a preferable outcome from a
democratic point of view. At issue in Eldridge is the ability of a
historically disadvantaged group to benefit equally from a program
which is widely characterized as a defining element of the Canadian
state, and as a fundamental right of social citizenship.33 Excluding the
Deaf from equal benefit of the health care system speaks loudly to their
social and political marginalization and to their corresponding invisibility
within the policy and legislative process. Recognition that a health care
system which fails to provide interpretation services is not, as Diane
Poithier has put it, "universal health care but rather the provision of
able-bodied health care,"34 is an important step towards recognition of
the Deaf as full and equal participants in Canadian society. It is also an
important step towards a better understanding of the measures which
are required for the Deaf to participate on an equal footing in our
democratic institutions.
A review of the actual circumstances of the Eldridge case makes
it clear that judicial deference is neither warranted nor deserved. By
concluding that the violation of the equality rights of the Deaf is justified
under section 1, Lambert J.A. confounds an exercise of discretion by a
legislative delegate with Parliamentary democracy itself.
III. RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY: THE
RJR-MacDONALD DECISION
At issue in the RiR -MacDonald case was whether the violation of
tobacco manufacturers' right to freedom of expression under section
2(b) of the Charter, resulting from restrictions on tobacco advertising
and promotion under the federal Tobacco Products Control Act,35 could
be justified under section 1 of the Charter. In her judgment for a
majority of the Court, McLachlin J. decided that the impugned
33 See, for example, National Forum on Health, Canada's Health Action: Building on the
Legacy-Synthesis Reports and Issues Papers (Ottawa: National Forum on Health, 1997) at 5;
Canadian Bar Association, Health Care Task Force, What's Law Got to do With It? Health Care
Reform in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, 1994) at 26-27; and Royal Commission on
New Reproductive Technologies, Proceed With Care: Final Report of the Royal Commission on New
Reproductive Technologies, Vol. 1 (Ottawa: Government Services Canada, 1993) (Chair: P. Baird) at
69-70.
3 4 D. Poithier, "M'Aider, Mayday: Section 15 of the Charter in Distress" (1996) 6 N.J.C.L. 295
at 338.
35 S.C. 1988, c. 20, ss. 4, 5, 6, 8, 9; reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, c. 14 (4th Supp.), as rep. by S.C.
1997. c. 13, s. 64 [hereinafter TpcA].
[VOL. 34 No. 4
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provisions of the Act could not survive section 1 scrutiny. In his
dissenting opinion, La Forest J. departed from the majority in finding
that the TPCA should be upheld under section 1. La Forest J.'s and
McLachlin J.'s decisions in relation to section 1 will be discussed in turn.
A. La Forest J.'s Analysis
La Forest J. began his discussion of section 1 by summarizing the
criteria established by the Supreme Court of Canada in Oakes,36 and
then by emphasizing that these principles must be applied flexibly, taking
into account the specific factual and social context of each case.37 The
nature of the impugned legislation was, he stressed, "highly relevant to a
proper application of the s. 1 analysis." 38 In the case of the TPCA, La
Forest J. concluded, Parliament was faced with the problem of meeting
its legislative mandate to protect public health in a context in which a
total ban on smoking was not a realistic policy option. In designing a
legislative solution, he suggested, Parliament sought to balance the
competing interests of smokers, non-smokers, and tobacco
manufacturers. The adoption of the TPCA was, La Forest J. pointed out,
the culmination of a lengthy and arduous process of legislative
deliberation. As he described it:
In drafting this legislation, Parliament took into account the views of Canadians from
many different sectors of society, representing many different interests. Indeed, the
legislative committee responsible for drafting ... the Act, heard from 104 organizations
during hearings in 1988 representing a variety of interests, including medicine, transport,
advertising, smokers' rights, non-smokers' rights, and tobacco production.
3 9
This was, La Forest J. suggested, a situation in which the
36 La Forest J. summarized the Oakes test, supra note 1, in PuR-MacDonald, supra note 9 at 268,
as follows:
In Oakes, this Court set out two broad criteria as a framework to guide courts in
determining whether a limitation is demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society. The first is that the objective the limit is designed to achieve must be of sufficient
importance to warrant overriding the constitutionally protected right or freedom. The
second is that the measures chosen to achieve the objective must be proportional to the
objective. The proportionality requirements has three aspects: the measures chosen must
be rationally connected to the objective; they must impair the guaranteed right or
freedom as little as possible; and there must be proportionality between the deleterious
effects of the measures and their salutary effects.
3 7 Ibid. at 270.
3 8 Ibid. at 272.
3 9 Ibid. at 278.
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considerations set out in McKinney were directly applicable and where a
more flexible application of the proportionality analysis under section 1
was warranted. Referring to his judgment in McKinney, La Forest J.
explained:
[I]t is clear that the Act is the very type of legislation to which this Court has generally
accorded a high degree of deference. In drafting this legislation, which is directed toward
a laudable social goal and is designed to protect vulnerable groups, Parliament was
required to compile and assess complex social science evidence and to mediate between
competing social interests. Decisions such as these are properly assigned to our elected
representatives, who have at their disposal the necessary resources to undertake them,
and who are ultimately accountable to the electorate.40
Having examined the nature of the legislation, La Forest J. went
on to apply the three elements of the proportionality criteria set out in
Oakes. Reviewing the evidence put forward by the federal government
in support of the TPCA, he found that there was a rational connection
between the legislative objective of reducing smoking and the ban on
tobacco advertising and promotion;41 that the choice of a full, rather
than a partial ban, was a reasonable approach which met the minimal
impairment criteria;42 and that the deleterious effect of limiting the free
speech of tobacco advertisers does not outweigh the legislation's
beneficial effects in terms of reducing smoking and its ill-effects.43 On
the basis of these findings, La Forest J. concluded that the impugned
provisions of the TPcA were reasonable and demonstrably justifiable
within the meaning of section 1.44
B. McLachlin J 'sAnalysis
In her majority opinion in the RUR -MacDonald case, McLachlin J.
accepted La Forest J.'s assertion that legislative context is an important
factor to be considered in determining whether a rights violation can be
justified under section 1. She stressed, however, that while a contextual
approach is important at the section 1 stage in determining the
legislative objective and in applying the proportionality criteria, "it
cannot be carried to the extreme of treating the challenged law as a
40 Ibid. at 279.
41 bid. at 303.
42 Ibid. at 306.
43 Ibid at 320.
44 Ibid at 325.
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unique socio-economic phenomenon, of which Parliament is deemed the
best judge."4S Otherwise, McLachlin J. warned, Parliament's obligation
to justify the limitations it places on Charter rights would be undercut
through the substitution of ad hoc judicial discretion for the reasoned
analysis required by section 1.
McLachlin J. also agreed that the degree of deference which the
courts should grant to Parliament may vary in accordance with the
context of each case.46 Referring to La Forest J.'s suggestion that
greater deference might be appropriate where a law is concerned with
competing rights between different sectors of society, rather than where
the state is acting as the "singular antagonist of the individual,"47
however, McLachlin J. cautioned that this distinction is not easy to
apply. She pointed to the TPCA itself as being an example of criminal
legislation that pits the state against the individual offender but which, at
the same time, is designed to balance competing social interests.
McLachlin J. insisted that, although the difficulty of devising legislative
solutions to complex problems may affect the degree of deference the
courts accord to Parliament or the legislatures:
As with context, ... care must be taken not to extend the notion of deference too far.
Deference must not be carried to the point of relieving the government of the burden
which the Charter places upon it of demonstrating that the limits it has imposed on
guaranteed rights are reasonable and justifiable.48
While Parliament has the role of choosing the appropriate
legislative response to social problems, in the event of a Charter
challenge, the courts must determine whether the choice Parliament has
made is constitutional. As McLachlin J. put it, "the courts are no more
permitted to abdicate their responsibility than is Parliament." 49 She
summarized the starting point of her analysis as follows:
While remaining sensitive to the social and political context of the impugned law and
allowing for difficulties of proof inherent in that context, the courts must nevertheless
insist that before the state can override constitutional rights, there be a reasoned
demonstration of the good which the law may achieve in relation to the seriousness of the
infringement. It is the task of the courts to maintain this bottom line if the rights
conferred by our constitution are to have force and meaning. 50
45 Ib. at 331.
46 Ibi. at 330-31.
47Ibid. at 277.
48 Ibid. at 332.
49 bid.
50 Ibid. at 329.
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With these introductory observations, McLachlin J. went on to
assess whether the TPcA was justifiable under section 1. In terms of
Parliament's objectives in enacting the legislation, McLachlin J. agreed
with La Forest J. that the goal of reducing tobacco consumption was
sufficiently important to warrant overriding the right to freedom of
expression.51 She disagreed with La Forest J., however, at the
proportionality stage of the Oakes analysis. In particular, she found that
the legislative ban on tobacco advertising and promotion, and the
packaging requirements imposed by the Act, did not meet the minimal
impairment requirement of the Oakes test. On that basis she concluded
that the legislation must be struck down.52
C. Assessing the Democratic Legitimacy of Rights Violations
Taken together, La Forest J.'s and McLachlin J.'s analysis of
section 1 in the RIR -MacDonald case offer important insights in terms of
conducting a section 1 review of individual rights violations that is
genuinely sensitive to democracy-related concerns. Throughout her
judgment in the RJR -MacDonald case, McLachlin J. emphasized the
overriding importance of a careful and principled judicial application of
each element of the, section 1 analysis in every case in which an
individual rights violation has occurred. McLachlin J. rejected the
argument that a differing level of section I scrutiny should be applied
according to whether the impugned legislation is classified as "criminal"
or "social" in character. As she pointed out, this distinction cannot be
sustained in practice since, in all Charter cases, there will be a conflict
between the state and the victim of the rights violation, and the state will
be pursuing some broader social purpose.
McLachlin J. recognized that legislative context must be taken
into account by the Court, both in assessing the legislature's objectives,
and in determining whether the proportionality criteria have been met.
However, she insisted that a complex legislative problem or context does
not vitiate the need for a high level of section 1 scrutiny, and that the
judiciary cannot abdicate its supervisory role in the name of judicial
deference to the institutional competence or legitimacy of the
legislature. In a constitutional democracy, McLachlin J. emphasized, the
legislatures and the courts each have their respective roles and
responsibilities: the legislatures must enact and implement social policy;
51 Ibid. at 336.
52 Ibid at 349-50.
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the courts must subject such policy to stringent review where it infringes
constitutional rights and principles.
In terms of an approach that sees the potential for enhancing
democracy through Charter review, McLachlin J.'s interpretive
framework has the merit of requiring judges to take seriously the task of
scrutinizing government decisionmaking. McLachlin J.'s analysis
requires a rigorous and principled application of section 1, in keeping
with the criteria established in the OakesS3 decision, without
prejudgment as to whether any particular degree of judicial deference is
owing to any particular form of legislation. McLachlin J. recognizes that
judicial failure to apply section 1 properly, under guise of deference to
the legislature, is inappropriate and unwarranted within our
constitutional democracy. On that basis, McLachlin J.'s judgment in
PJR -MacDonald is fundamentally at odds with Sopinka J.'s reasoning in
Egan, and with Lambert J.A.'s approach in Eldridge.
As discussed in Part II, above, in Egan, Sopinka J. applied a
highly attenuated level of section 1 scrutiny to the OASA based on a
presumption about the legislative category to which the Act belongs:
social benefits legislation with which the courts should not interfere. In
the Eldridge case, Lambert J.A. failed altogether to subject the
province's discriminatory health care regime to section 1 review in
accordance with the Oakes principles. While Sopinka J.'s and Lambert
J.A.'s decisions are couched in terms of deference to democratic
principles, they amount to a clear abdication of judicial responsibility of
the type McLachlin J. criticized in mR -MacDonald.
The value of La Forest J.'s approach in the RiR -MacDonald case
lies in its insistence on the need to engage in a careful and contextual
examination of the legislation that infringes a Charter right. La Forest
J.'s emphasis on legislative context makes it impossible to engage in the
type of cursory section 1 analysis which characterizes Sopinka J.'s and
Lambert J.A.'s decisions in the Egan and Eldridge cases. First, La Forest
J.'s approach draws attention to the nature of the decisionmaker;
second, it focuses on the actual form of the decision; and third, it
examines the specific process through which a decision infringing a
Charter right is made.
In terms of the decisionmaker, the government entity responsible
for the Charter violation in the R.R -MacDonald case was the legislature
itself. The action by Parliament in adopting the advertising ban and
packaging requirements contained in the TPCA, rather than the actions of
a legislative delegate or sub-delegate, were the target of review. In
5 3 Supra note 1.
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terms of the form of the decision, the RIR-MacDonald case involved a
challenge to legislation, rather than to regulation, rule, policy or
practice. In terms of the decision-making process, as in the McKinney
case, the offending provisions of the TPcA were enacted by Parliament
after a lengthy period of in-depth legislative study and debate. These
deliberations took place both in the House of Commons and at the
parliamentary committee stage, where numerous witnesses appeared to
present competing points of view as to the merits of the legislation.5 4 In
particular, the tobacco industry had ample opportunity to participate in
the legislative process, not only in appearances before the committee by
individual tobacco manufacturers, distributors, retailers, advertisers, and
tobacco industry sponsored sports and arts groups, but in related and
well-financed lobbying before and during Parliamentary committee
study of the Bill5.
As La Forest J. pointed out in his judgment, considerable
evidence was presented by the federal government to demonstrate that
Parliament engaged in a careful weighing of competing interests and
concerns in coming to its decision to adopt the restrictions contained in
the TPCA.56 After assessing the information brought forward by the
various interests involved, including evidence as to the negative
economic effects the legislation would have for the tobacco, sports, and
cultural industries, Parliament decided to restrict tobacco
manufacturers' Charter right to commercial free speech in order to
protect and promote the health of Canadians.
In terms of the nature of the decisionmaker, the form of the
decision, and the decision-making process, the Eldridge and Egan cases
are far removed from the lR-MacDonald situation. As discussed in Part
II(B), above, the decisionmaker in Eldridge was not the legislature, but
rather a legislative sub-delegate within the provincial health ministry.
The decision under challenge was not the enactment of provincial
54 Canada, House of Commons, Legislative Committee on Bill C-204, Minutes of Proceedings
and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on'Bill C-204, an Act to regulate smoking in the federal
workplace and Bill C-51, an Act to prohibit the advertising and promotion and repecting the labelling
and monitoring of tobacco products, 2d Sess., 33d Parl., 1986-1987 (Chair: K.A. James) Issue no. 15
(1 December 1987); Issue no. 16 (10 December 1987) at 16:9; Issue no. 17 (15 December 1987);
Issue no. 18 (17 December 1987); and Issue no. 19 (18 January 1988). See also Canada, House of
Commons, Debates, 2d. Sess., 33d Pan., vol. IX (23 November 1987) at 11042-57; vol. X (4 February
1988) at 12607; and vol. XIII (31 May 1988) at 15949-65.
55 See "Neville bullied bureaucrats, non-smokers' group alleges" The [Ottawa] Citizen (26
June 1989) Al; and J. Sawatsky, The Insiders: Government, Business, and the Lobbyists (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart, 1987) Epilogue at 347-48.
56 RJR-MacDonald, supra note 9 at 242-43 and 278.
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hospital and medical insurance legislation. Rather, the Charter violation
in Eldridge resulted from the interpretation and application of that
legislation by the Executive Committee of the Ministry of Health: the
body to whom the Health Minister delegated the responsibility granted
to her by the legislature for making decisions about programs and
funding. It was the exercise of discretion by the Executive Committee to
deny funding for interpretation services for the Deaf, not the actions of
the legislature itself, which created the equality rights violation being
challenged.
Finally, the decision-making process in Eldridge was in no way
analogous to the one approved by La Forest J. in mR-MacDonald. The
decision at issue in Eldridge was made in response to a request by a
volunteer agency, the Western Institute for the Deaf, which was unable
to continue providing interpretation services free of charge to the Deaf
without government assistance. A briefing note on the medical
interpretation issue was prepared by a senior health ministry official for
consideration by the Executive Committee. The Committee spent only
twenty minutes reviewing the briefing note before deciding to refuse
funding. The explanation given for the Committee's decision was that
"it was felt [that] to fund this particular request would set a precedent
that might be followed up by further requests from the ethnic
communities where the language barrier might also be a factor."5 7 The
Committee made its decision in the absence of any information as to
whether or not providing interpretation services for the Deaf would be
cost-efficient; whether funding such services would in fact set a
precedent for non-English speaking groups; and what the actual cost of
providing interpretation for non-English speaking patients might be.S8
In sharp contrast to the decision-making process in the wRR-
MacDonald case, the decision in the Eldridge case was made in an
informal and ad hoc way, based on insufficient information, and with no
meaningful effort to consider whether it was necessary to violate the
equality rights of the Deaf in order to protect the competing rights or
interests of another group, or to respond to some other compelling
social concern. In short, neither the decisionmaker, the form of the
5 7 Eldridge, supra note 8 at 164. See also Factum of the Appellants in the Supreme Court of
Canada on Appeal from the Court of Appeal for British Columbia between Robin Susan Eldridge,
John Henry Warren and Linda Jane Warren, Appellants and Attorney General of British Columbia,
Attorney General of Canada and Medical Services Commission, Respondents, Court File No. 24896
[unpublished]; and Factum of the Interveners in the Supreme Court of Canada, Canadian Association
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decision, nor the decision-making process in Eldridge warranted a level
of deference equivalent to what La Forest J. deemed appropriate in
relation to Parliament's choice in the RIR -MacDonald case.
While Parliament adopted the impugned measure in the Egan
case, the decision-making process in that case is likewise far different
from the process through which the freedom of expression of tobacco
manufacturers was abridged in RIR-MacDonald. In 1975, Parliament
introduced the spousal allowance and included a definition of spouse in
the OASA that was limited to heterosexual couples.59 In his testimony
before the parliamentary committee studying the legislation at the time,
the federal Minister of Health and Welfare indicated that the
government's purpose in establishing the spousal allowance scheme was
to alleviate poverty amongst elderly couples. 60 He made no mention of
the exclusion of same-sex couples. Changes to the eligibility rules for
spousal allowances were made in 1977, 1979, 1984, and 1985, and on
each occasion the legislative changes were prefaced by consideration in
committee.6 1 While there was much parliamentary discussion of
whether single, separated, divorced, or widowed persons should be able
to claim a spousal allowance, the needs of same-sex couples were not
addressed or even raised for consideration. 62 These parliamentary
discussions of the old age spousal allowance occurred before the
development of any jurisprudence under the equality rights provisions of
the Charter, at a time when same-sex family forms received far less social
59 An Act to amend the Old Age Security Act, to repeal the OldAgeAssistanceAct and to amend
otherActs in consequence thereof, S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 58, s. 1(2).
6 0 Egan, supra note 7 at 534, citing Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on
Health, Welfare and Social Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence respecting Bill C-62, An Act
to amend the Old Age Security Act and to amend other Acts in consequence thereof, 1st Sess., 30th
Pan., 1974-75 (Chair G. Isabelle) Issue no. 25 (12 June 1975) at 25:7.
61 For relevant amendments to the OASA see S.C. 1976-77, c. 9; S.C. 1979, c. 4; S.C. 1984, c. 27;
and S.C. 1985, c. 30. For committee discussions, see Canada, House of Commons, Standing
Committee on Health, Welfare and Social Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence respecting
Bill C-35, An Act to amend the Old Age Security Act, 2d Sess., 30th Pad., 1976-77 (Chair: K.
Robinson) Issue no. 23 (24 February 1977) at 23:8-10; Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence
respecting Organization meeting and Supplementing Estimates (A) 1977 under National Health and
Welfare, 3d Sess., 30th Par., 1977 (Chair: J.-R. Gauthier) Issue no. 1 (15 November 1977) at 1:26-
29; Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence respecting Organization Bill C-6--An Act to amend the Old
Age SecurityAct, 1st Sess., 31st ParI., 1979 (Chair. B. Halliday) Issue no. 1 (30 October 1979) at 1:23-
25; Issue no. 4 (6 November 1979) at 4:11-14; Minues of Proceedings and Evidence respecting Bill C-
26, AnAct to amend the OldAge SecurityAct, 1st sess., 33d ParI., 1984-85 (Chair: B. Halliday) Issue
no. 12 (24 April 1985) at 12:6-23; Issue no. 13 (7 May 1985) at 13:26-32; and Issue no. 15 (9 May
1985) at 15:5-31.
62 See the committee debates cited supra note 61; and Canada, House of Commons, Debates,
1st Sess., 33d Pan., vol. 11 (4 February 1985) at 1941-55.
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attention or legal recognition.
It is not surprising, then, that the government in Egan provided
no evidence that Parliament was engaged, or saw itself as being engaged
in any balancing of competing rights or concerns when it limited benefits
under the Act to heterosexual couples. Thus, in assessing the
discriminatory provisions of the OASA under section I of the Charter,
neither considerations relating to the institutional competence of
Parliament, nor those relating to its democratic legitimacy, should come
into play. Contrary to the situation discussed by La Forest J. in JR-
MacDonald, nothing in the legislative context of the Egan case gives
cause to question why the ordinary level of section 1 scrutiny should not
apply.
IV. CONCLUSION
At the outset of this article, I argued that the courts must pay
more attention to democracy-related considerations in their review of
Charter violations. In particular, I suggested that, in determining
whether individual rights violations should be upheld under section 1 of
the Charter, judges should pay careful attention to the democratic quality
of government decisions that infringe individual rights. Judges have
frequently justified rights violations on democratic principles; arguing
that the courts should defer to the greater institutional competence and
democratic legitimacy of the legislature, particularly in the social policy
field. On closer inspection, however, judges are often deferring to
decisionmakers, decisions, and decision-making processes which are
"legislative" only in the most formalistic sense. I pointed to Egan and
Eldridge as examples of cases where, in the name of deference to the
legislature, judicial failure to subject government action to proper
section 1 scrutiny produced a democratically deficient outcome.
In answer to this tendency towards excessive judicial deference
under section 1, I pointed to McLachlin J.'s and La Forest J.s' judgments
in the RIR -MacDonald case. For her part, McLachlin J. insisted upon a
rigorous section 1 analysis of any government action that infringes
individual rights, however the action is characterized. La Forest J.'s
approach to section 1 review, with its strong emphasis on legislative
context, forces judges to actually examine the form and process of
government decision-making before deciding whether Charter violations
are justifiable. Read together, McLachlin J.'s and La Forest J.'s
approaches to section 1 promote a more accurate and proactive review
of the democratic legitimacy of individual-rights violations.
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Thus, where it can be shown, in a rigorous and contextualized
process of section 1 review, that the legislature has come to a decision to
infringe a Charter right through a careful balancing of competing rights
and concerns, a degree of deference to that decision at the minimal
impairment stage of section 1 analysis may be warranted. However,
where a decision that infringes a Charter right is made not by the
legislature, but by a legislative delegate or sub-delegate; where a
decision is made by regulation, rule, policy, or practice, rather than by
law; or where a decision is the result of ah uninformed, unreasoned, or
otherwise deficient decision-making process, no attenuation of the
ordinary standard of section 1 review is justifiable.
In other words, a decision that infringes a Charter right should
not be assumed automatically to be democratically legitimate because, in
strict legal terms, the legislature is ultimately responsible for the
decision. In place of unprincipled deference, the courts should insist
that governments demonstrate, on the facts of each case, how the
violation of individual rights promotes rather than undermines
democratic principles. As discussed in Part II, above, in relation to the
Egan and Eldridge cases, Charter review provides a crucial opportunity to
hold legislatures to account for decisions which result from majoritarian
biases and other forms of malfunctioning within the political process.
Only by abandoning their current legalistic and potentially
anti-democratic vision of our Parliamentary democracy, and by applying
section 1 in a contextualized and rigorous way, will the courts ensure that
the Charter fulfils its "immeasurably richer role"63 of protecting rights
and of promoting democracy.
63 R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 at 735, Dickson, C.J., cited by La Forest J. in RtlJ-
MacDonald, supra note 9 at 271.
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